Armenian Population in Eastern Anatolia Between Years 1878-1915

Armenian Population in Eastern Anatolia

Between Years 1878-1915

Prof. Dr. Ata ATUN

Near East University

Lefkoşa, T. R. North Cyprus

E-mail: ata.atun@atun.com    Tel: +90 533 881 1111

 

 

Abstract:

 

Most of the Armenian allegations on the Armenian relocation in the year 1915 based on the Armenian Patriarch’s reports and the book titled “Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story” written by Mr. Henry Morgenthau Sr..

Mr. Morgenthau was the U.S. Ambassador in Istanbul from 1913 to 1916, his book on which the Armenian allegations mainly based on, when cross checked day by day with his diary, reveals the fact that it is tailored rather than conveying the real truth on what happened during this era.

The population and events recorded by various officials, organizations, Armenian Church ecclesiastics and local governments before Armenian relocation on 1915 and after the World War I, reveals the fact that the loss of lives during relocation is far below than the alleged fictitious number.

This paper, going through various non Ottoman documents, tries to reach to actual population before and after the relocation with the intention to figure out the number of loss of lives during this incident.             

 

Key words: Armenian relocation, 1915, Armenian population, Hearings in USA House of Representative, Deportation, 

 

Introduction

 

The Armenian population in eastern Anatolia just before the relocation, according to non Ottoman records, contradicts with the Armenian allegation of 2.5 million, which forms the basis of lives lost during the deportation in 1915.

 

The Armenian allegations based on mainly to the declarations of Patriarch Nerses Varjabedian on 1878, Patriarch Hovannes Arsaruni’s estimation through Mr. Kirkor Zohrab on 1912 and to book “Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story” written by Ambassador Henry Morgenthau on 1918 where a serious research revelaed later that the ghostwriter Morgenthau was Burton J. Hendrick.

 

Patriarch Nerses Varjabedian had forwarded statistics bearing large figures, as over 2.5 million on 1878 to Berlin Conference as the Armenian population living in eastern Anatolia.

 

The Armenian Patriarch Hovannes Arsaruni[1] (1912-13) estimated the Armenian population as over 2.1 million on 1912.

 

Both figures are not based on the birth or baptize or death records of the Patriarchate or to any kind of official register but purposely puffed up to demand autonomy from the Sublime Port of Ottoman Empire.

 

Patriarch N. Varjabedian’s declaration of Armenian Population on 1880

 

The Patriarchate sent an informative statistical letters to the embassies of the than Great Power States on the year 1878 and 1880, giving details of the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire, mainly in the Anatolia region[2].

His figures, as seen in below chart, almost had a difference of 586,315 people within 2 years.

 

The year 1878 figures were submitted to Berlin Congress on 1878 by the Patriarch.

The year 1880-a figures were submitted to the British Ambassador on 24 June 1880[3] by the Patriachate. On July 1880, Odian Effendi of Patriarchate submitted a further list to Sir Charles Dilke (F.O[4]. 424/106/200[5]) of the British Foreign Office in London. Later on Patriarch sent another one with amended figures on September 10, 1880[6].

The year 1880-b figures are the Patriarch’s corrected list (F.O. 424/106/273), with the Sivas correction (F.O. 424/107/135).

 

Year 1878       Year 1880-a       Year 1880-b

Erzurum               –                    215,177             111,000

Van                  1,150,000          184,000

Bitlis                    –                    164,500             252,500

Diyarbekir           –                         –                      88,000

Elaziz                   –                         –                    155,000

Sivas                    –                         –                    199,245

TOTAL             1,150,000          563,677             805,745

 

 

 

 

Patriarch N. Varjabedian’s declaration of Armenian Population on 1881[7]

 

The Armenian population in six provinces (including Catholics and Protestants), according to the Patriarchate, were:

 

Year 1881

Erzurum            128,478

Van                    133,859

Bitlis                  130,460

Diyarbekir              –

Elaziz                 107,059

Sivas                  243,515

TOTAL                743,371

 

Patriarch N. Varjabedian’s declaration of Armenian Population on 1882[8].

 

Year 1882

Erzurum            280,000

Van                    400,000

Bitlis                  250,000

Diyarbekir               –

Elaziz                 270,000

Sivas                  280,000

TOTAL             1,630,371

 

Marcel Leart[9]’s findings on Armenian population on the year 1882, alleging that it was taken from the Patriarchate’s list.

 

Year 1882[10]

Van                    400,000

Bitlis                  250,000

Diyarbekir         150,000

Erzurum            280,000

Elaziz                 270,000

Sivas                  280,000       

Total of 6 provinces 1,630,000

 

Adana                280,000

Aleppo               100,000        (Antep, Urfa, Kilis, Marash)

Total of 2 provinces                   380,000

 

Trabzon             120,000

Bursa                   60,000

Aydın                   50,000

Ankara               120,000        (Ankara, Kastamonu, Konya)

Grand Syria         40,000        (Syria, Beirut, Musul, Baghdad, Basrah)

Izmir province     65,000              

Total of 6 provinces                   455,000

 

Istanbul             135,000        (Istanbul and surroundings)

Edirne                  50,000

European Turkey 10,000        (Ottoman territories in Eastern Europe)

Total of 2 provinces and Balkans 195,000

 

Grand Total for Ottoman Empire: 2,660,000

 

When both lists put together side by side as below, it can be clearly seen that while Patriarch’s first list revealing a population of Armenians living in the area totaling 743,371 for the year 1881, the second list for the year 1882 of both Patriarch’s and Marcel Leart’s, which primarily was based on the Patriach’s list[11], reveals an incredible number of 1,630,000, alleging that within a year the Armenian population living in the above mentioned  6 provinces, namely Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Diyarbekir, Elaziz and Sivas did increase a mere 886,629 Armenians.

 

Year 1881      Year 1882 (Patriarch and Leart)

Erzurum            128,478           280,000

Van                    133,859           400,000

Bitlis                  130,460           250,000

Diyarbekir         –                      150,000

Elaziz                 107,059           270,000

Sivas                  243,515           280,000

TOTAL                743,371        1,630,000

 

Major Henry Trotter, who was an expert on population in the British Embassy realized immediately the discordant figures in the consecutive reports of the Patriarchate and wrote down a memorandum to his ambassador on February 15, 1882 on the matter.

 

According to Major Henry Trotter’s report[12], dated February 15, 1882, the Armenian population in Bitlis, Hekkari, Erzurum, Van region totaled as 373,500 Armenian and 85,000 Nestorian.

 

Major Trotter’s deposition  in his report “During a meeting of the Armenian National Assembly, in the last autumn, Mr. Sdépan Papazian, the presumed author of the statistical figures presented to the Berlin Conference, took on violently to the patriarch to have communicated to the Embassies the statistical figures without having consulted first the National Assembly, what consequentially drew the attention of the opinion to the enormous differences between the figures of Berlin and those supplied more recently by the patriarchy and to provoke remarks on the doubtful character of these two series of figures (…) In the list of Berlin, by an apparently dishonest manipulation of the official figures, the purpose aimed at was to prove that, according to these figures, the Armenian population of Erzurum and Van (including Erzurum and Hakkari) amounted to 1,150,000 souls. I demonstrated afterward that the real number did not exceed doubtlessly 450,000. As for the figures supplied by the Patriarch in the embassy in 1880, they indicated a population of 373,500 Armenians, and 85,000 Nestorians.” clearly proves that the population figures supplied by the Patriarch were purposely inflated from 373,500 of the year 1880 to 1,150,000 in the year 1882. An unbelievable and non logical birthrate and increase of 777,000 souls in population within 2 years time period only.

 

Vahan Vardapet’s declaration of entire Armenian Population on 1886 living in the Ottoman Empire.

 

In an Armenian news paper published in Istanbul and titled Ceride-i Şarkiye (Djeridei Sharkieh[13]) dated  December 3-15, 1886 an Armenian clerical writer Vahan Vardapet gave the figure of 1,263,000 as the total population of the Armenians living with in the territories of Ottoman Empire. His figures included Catholic, Orthodox and Gregorian Armenians.

 

Marcel Leart’s findings on Armenian Population on year 1912

 

Marcel Leart’s findings on Armenian Population in the provinces of Erzurum, Van, Bitlis, Harput, Diyarbekir and Sivas for the year 1912 totals as 2,615,000 where Moslems were 666,000 and Armenians 1,018,000. The numbers were based on Patriarchate’s again for the year 1882.

 

 

Details of Leart’s findings.

Total of population

Province     Including minorities             Turks           Armenians

Erzurum               630,000                       240,000        215,000

Van                      350,000                         47,000        185,000

Bitlis                    382,000                         40,000        180,000

Harput                 450,000                       102,000        168,000

Diyarbekir           296,000                         45,000        105,000

Sivas                    507,000                       192,000        165,000

TOTAL              2,615,000                       666,000       1,018,000

 

 

Richard Hovannisian’s findings on Armenian Population before 1914

 

Richard Hovannisian[14] in his book titled “Armenia On The Road To Independence”, alleges that before 1914 the Armenian population in Turkey was between 1,500,000 and  2,000,000.

Hrant Pasdermadjian’s findings on Armenian Population on year 1914

 

Hrant Pasdermadjian[15] in his book titled “Histoire de l’Armenie” alleges that, in the year 1914, 2,100,000 Armenians were living in Ottoman Empire,  1,700,000 in Russia and total of 4,100,000 Armenians in the world.

 

 

 

Arshak Chobanian’s findings on Armenian Population on year 1914

 

Arshak Chobanian[16], as the member of the Armenian National Delegation led by Boghos Nubar Pasha, prepared a report on the Armenian population in the territories of Ottoman Empire and on the world stating 2,380,000 Armenians living in the Ottoman empire and 4,160,000 on the world.

 

Jacques de Morgan’s findings on Armenian Population on year 1914

 

Jacques de Morgan[17], in his book titled “Histoire du Peuple Armenian” alleges that in the year 1914, 2,380,000 Armenians were living  in the Ottoman Empire and total of 4,160,000 io the world. (It is strongly believed that he obtained the population  figures from Arshak Chobanian’s report)

 

Letter sent by the U.S. Consul in Aleppo, J.B. Jackson sent on Feb.8th, 1916 to U.S. Ambassador Morgenthau.

 

U.S. Archive Doc. 59.867.48/21 is a Report – Letter sent by the U.S. Consul in Aleppo, J.B. Jackson sent on Feb.8th, 1916 to U.S. Ambassador Morgenthau, and gives a list of various camps in Syria region totaling to 486.000 and without referring to any killings[18].

 

Memorandum given by the Armenian Delegation to Paris Peace Conference on Feb. 12, 1919 signed by A. Aharonian and Boghos Nubar.

 

Refer to this memorandum given by the Armenian Delegation to Paris Peace Conference on Feb. 12, 1919 signed by A. Aharonian and Boghos Nubar. This memorandum says that 1.400.000 Armenians is alive at that time. The same is almost confirmed by Greek PM Venizelos at the same Conference[19].

Near East Relief Report on Armenians alive in Syria in the year 1921. 

 

The report states that[20] after F. Bouillon’s Treaty with Kemalist Turks 300.000 Armenians returned to Cilicia after British-French occupation, but that they evacuated the region in 1921. The report clearly declares that around 200.000 to 300.000 Armenians were alive in Syria region seeking for relief.

 

Near East Relief Report on Armenians alive in Armenia in the year 1921. 

 

The report states that the number of resident Armenians in (Caucasus) Armenia is 1,000,000 in the year 1921 and half of these people around, 500,000 applied to Relief Organization for relief[21].

 

 

Near East Relief Report[22] does not mention the word or an incident of massacre or genocide or any other word with similar meaning or context  in any paragraph.

 

The report does not speak of or mention in any line or paragraph the word “massacre or genocide” or any other word with similar meaning or context.

 

The report US Senate Resolution No. 266, April 22

 

The report US Senate Resolution No. 266, April 22, 1922 resolves that on 31.12.1921 there was 1.414.000 Armenians living in Turkey-Syria-and Russia. There is no indication of any massacre at all[23].

 

U.S. Document Authority Letter 1-8-58, signed by State Department W.R. Anderson in the year 1922.

 

U.S. Document[24] “Authority Letter 1-8-58, signed by State Department W.R. Anderson” gives the number of all Armenians on the whole world in the year 1922. This document states that the total population is 3,004,000 of which 817,873 are refugees from Turkey and that 281,000 Armenians live in Turkey.

 

The Memorandum submitted to the Lausanne Peace Conference on 1923

 

The Memorandum given to the 1923 to the Lausanne Peace Conference on 2.2.1923 states that 760,000 Armenians are alive[25].

 

Ethnic Cleansing by Dashnagtzoutun Party during the years 1918-1920

 

Soviet historian Mr. A. A. Lalaian, who was originally an Armenian and a journalist as well, published his findings in Russian language on the “Tashnak” period of Caucaus Armenia,  in the Russian magazine“Revolyutsionniy Vostok” (Revolutionist East) No. 2-3 of 1936 under the title  “Anti-Revolutionist Tashnaksyutin and Imperialist War 1914-1918”. The magazine was edited and printed by Russian National and Colonial Studies Organization.

 

The Republic of Armenia (Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, May 1918 to December 1920) was founded in month May of 1918 and the first Prime minister Mr. Hovhannes Katchaznouni ruled the country from May 1918 to 1919.

According to Lalain[26], in the year 1918 within the boundaries of Caucasus Armenia, total of 1,200,000 people of mainly 5 different nations were living[27].

 

During the dictatorship of Dashnags, under the reign of Prime minister Katchaznouni from 1918 till 1920 the population decreased by a total of 430,000 man, woman and children of the 5 different nations. The Armenians decreased by 35%, the Turks by 77%, the Kurds by 98% and the Yezidis by 40% total amounting to 430,000.

 

The below table shows the decrease by year and by per nation.

 

Nations                   1918               1920              % Loss

Armenians           885,000           690,500           22 %

Turks                    260,000             60,000           77 %

Kurds                     25,000                  500          98 %

Yezids                       8,000              5,000           40 %

Russians                 15,000            14,000            7 %

Other nations          7,000               4,000          43 %

Total                 1,200,000           774,000          35.5 %

 

 

Conclusion part of  Mr. Şükrü Server Aya’s review of the report “Near East Relief Report dated 31 December 1929” of the US Senate. 

 

“Conclusion[28]: According to this report, the Armenian deaths are unbelievably low if we are to add 1 million alive in 1921 (say 800.000 in Armenia after loss of 200.000 by starvation plus 200.000 or 300.000 in Syria district) we have a figure of 1.1 million alive and by adding those who went to other countries, Greek Islands etc. we arrive to about 1.3 million alive in 1921. If we are to depend on this report which is an official U.S. document, the deaths due to several reasons are much to less and only around 300.000 (or 20% versus 40% estimated by McCarthy for Turks and Armenians in the area)”.

 

 

Comparative estimates of Armenian population existed with in the territories of Ottoman Empire during years 1880 and 1920.

 

Year       Source                                                  Estimated Population

1878      Patriarchate (Subm. to Berlin Conf.)   1,150,000

1880      Patriarch N. Varjabedian                        563,677 and 805,743[29]

1881      Patriarch N. Varjabedian                        743,371[30]

1882      Patriarch N. Varjabedian                     1,630,371[31]

1882      Marcel Leart (Kirkor Zöhrap)               1,660,000[32]

1886      Vahan Vardapet[33]                                 1,263,000[34]

1892      Vital Cuninet[35]                                      1,475,011[36]

1895      Francis de Presence                             1,260,000[37]

1896      Felix Weber                                          1,000,000[38]

1900      Tournbize[39]                                           1,300,000

1901      H. F. B. Lynch[40]                                      1,325,000[41]

1901      Ludovic de Constenson[42]                      1,383,779[43]

1905      Ottoman State Census                         1,294,851

1910      Encycloapedia Britannica (Year 1910) 1,500,000[44]

1912      Marcel Leart (Kirkor Zöhrap)               1,018,000

1912      British Blue Book                                  1,056,000

1913      Armenian Patriarchate                        1,915,651

1913      Ludovic de Constenson                         1,056,000-1,400,000[45]

1914      Richard Hovannisian                            1,500,000-2,000,000[46]

1914      Daniel Panzac[47]                                    1,5000,000-1,600,000[48]

1914      Justin McCarthy[49]                                 1,698,303

1914      Ottoman Empire Census[50]                   1,229,007[51]

1914      Patriarch Ormanian                             1,579,000[52]

1914      J. Lepsius                                              1,600,000

1914      Christopher V. Walker                          1,500,000-2,000,000[53]

1914      Stanford J. Shaw[54]                                1,294,851

1914      David Magie[55]                                      1,479,000[56]

1914      Clair Price                                            1,500,000[57]

1914      Vital Cuinet                                          1,475,000[58] (Asian territories)

1914      Hrant Pastirmadjian                             2,100,000[59]

1914      Alexander E. Powell                             1,500,000[60]

1914      Arshak Chobanian                                2,380,000[61]

1914      Jacques de Morgan                              2,380,000[62]

1914      Grabill (All over Ott. Empire)              1,800,000-2,000,000[63]

1910      Encycloapedia Britannica (year 1914) 1,500,000

1915      National Geographic                            2,000,000 (Ottoman, Russia, Persia)

1915      New York Times (Oct 22, 1915)           1,200,000

1917      Russian Official Statistics                     1,700,000[64]

1918      Encycloapedia Britannica (Year 1918) 2,000,000

1918      A. A. Lalaian                                            885,000 (Only in Armenia)

1919      A. Aharonian and Bohos Nubar            1,400,000[65]

1919      Akaby Nessibian                                   1,080,000[66]

1920      Ohannes Katchaznuni[67]                        1,000,000   (after emigration)

1920      Kevork Aslan                                         1,800,000[68]

1921      Near East Relief Report                       1,000,000[69]

 

Conclusion

 

According to the above 45 reports, findings and estimates of researches, historians, diplomats, institutions and clergy, the minimum Armenian population seems was 743,000 and the maximum 2,380,000.

 

Based on the mean value of the above findings;

Between years 1878 and 1914, around 1,475,565 and years 1878 and 1921, around 1,398,020 Armenians were living in the area.

 

When the population of Armenians estimated by Christian researches or clergies are compared with the Ottoman Empire’s Statistical Department’s records for the period between 1892 to 1914, it seems they are remarkably close to each other.

 

A mathematical study shows that for the period between 1878 to 1914, the minimum average Armenian population lived within the Empires boundaries was around 1,596,417 and the maximum was 1,667,228.

 

The alleged death of 1,500,000 Armenians during relocation in the year 1915 do not match with the population figures lived in the area pre 1915 and post 1916.

 

Physically it is almost impossible to kill 1,500,000 lives within 5 months in the year 1915 conditions in Eastern Anatolia, where four fifth of the alleged victims were adults. Lack of ammunition and shortage of military troops do not make the accusation sensible or logical, when taking into consideration a total of 10,000 persons were executed every day.

 

Using a pickaxe and a shovel, to dig a mass grave big enough to hold 10,000 bodies of a volume 2,160 cubic meters, would need 5000 hrs of work and 5,000 workers per day, subject no rain and good food and rest place for a nonstop 150 days, with no week end resting.

Even after 30 years with a better and an advanced technology and machinery the Germany’s Nazi leader Adolf Hitler, in his death camps couldn’t executed and disposed 10,000 bodies per day.

 

Even if such an execution were carried on for 150 days on run, where were these bodies disposed or buried. Till today not even a single mass graveyard was discovered or detected.

 

It is obvious from the above figures that the Armenian allegations of 1,500,000 loss of lives during relocation in the year 1915 is just a hoax.

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Book Review by ATA ATUN: Preposterous Paradoxes of Ambassador Morgenthau: A Factual Story About Politics, Propaganda and Distortions

Book Review by ATA ATUN: Preposterous Paradoxes of Ambassador Morgenthau: A Factual Story About Politics, Propaganda and Distortions

 

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Sukru Server Aya’s new book titled “Preposterous Paradoxes of Ambassador Morgenthau: A Factual Story About Politics, Propaganda and Distortions” is expected to be released in February 1913.

Here’s a review  by Professor Dr. Ata ATUN:

The book titled “Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story” written by Mr. Henry Morgenthau Sr. the U.S. Ambassador in Istanbul from 1913 to 1916, on which the Armenian allegations mainly based on, when cross checked day by day with his diary, reveals the fact that it is tailored rather than conveying the real truth on what happened during this era.

Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, during his 780 days of diplomatic mission in Istanbul, did not even travel ten miles out of the city to any countryside village, except a few on the Bosporus and the Belgrade Forest where he and his friends frequently went horse riding. The only trip he took was by ship to Greece and Egypt in March 1914 and from there to Palestine Holy Lands and cities, ending in Beirut. . .

From there he boarded his assigned yacht – (gun boat) Scorpion to travel to Mersin, Adana, Rhodes, Smyrna and finally Istanbul in 40 days. It was like a cruise holiday and he never rode on a horse or a car on the soil of Ottoman Empire. He did not travel eastbound, never went further than 10 miles east of Skudari (Üsküdar) and did not visit the eastern regions of Anatolia.

His book titled “Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story” is based solely on what he heard and was told. These kinds of evidences or depositions are called “Hear to say” and not taken into consideration or credited in the courts of justices.

It is obvious that the stories in the book are fictious, rather than the reality, actually came into life in the minds of Mr. Arshag Schimavonian, the dragoman (interpreter) of the USA Embassy in Istanbul who acted as the Ambassador Morgenthau’s advisor and right hand together with his secretary Mr. Hagop Andonian who both were anti-Turkish Armenians. Their made up stories ingeniously converted to a novel style history book by Mr. Burton J. Hendrick, a Pulitzer Prize winner, who actually is the ghost writer of the book. He did write the book using all his skills.

Pulitzer Prize winner Mr. Hendrick, by magically “putting words in their mouths” of the story tellers as if there was a sound recorder and the conversations were put down verbatim years later in the book, made a fortune out of this tell-a-tale book, by receiving forty percent of the revenues from the sales and a mere $15,000 in cash, equivalent of $1,263,823 of the year 2012. Dressings were all produced in the USA to make the story look real either by Hendrick himself or Schimavonian and Andonian.

The main reason why the book titled “Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story” published was to write a book damning the Turks and the Germans, which would justify the USA’s entrance in the war. It was the idea of Ambassador Morgenthau and he made his offer to President Wilson, whom he was very close to. USA and Britain knew that this was an “Ordered book to serve as a trump card” for USA to participate in WW I.

President Wilson supported the idea and a new team was set up for his alleged services in Turkey to be explained in his reputed book. The team leaders were Mr. Arshag Schimavonian and Mr. Hagop Andonian. Although the author of the book is declared to be the Ambassador Henry Morgenthau, it is by now known by everybody that the actual writer was Mr. Burton J. Hendrick and he considered Morgenthau’s, Schimavonian’s and Andonian’s stories as reliable sources.

After almost 75 years the credibility of the Morgenthau’s book was scholarly researched and a serious check back was done by Prof. Heath W. Lowry for the first time in his book “The Story Behind Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story”, published by the Isis Press, Istanbul 1990 (ISBN 975-428-019-3). The result was a disaster for Mr. “Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story” book.

This very book titled “Preposterous Paradoxes of Ambassador Morgenthau” written solely by Mr. Sükrü Server Aya, the reliable and distinguished researcher on the Armenian Allegations, cross checks day by day the diary of Mr. Ambassador and his notorious book titled “Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story”.

I used word “notorious” deliberatively, because the output of this cross check reveals the fact that Mr. Ambassador’s book was tailored rather than conveying the real truth on what happened before, during and after deportation on the year 1915.

Professor Dr. Ata ATUN

Academic and Researcher
T.R.N. Cyprus

The book is a continuation of the chapter 15 of Armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2010/12/3189-genocide-of-truth-continues-but.html which can be read and downloaded at the given link

For more remarks by Aya on Morgenthau see also Armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2010/08/3121-morgenthau-book-review-by-sukru.html

This last book of about 240 pages, elaborates deeper and demonstrates the distortions and inversions by Ambassador Morgenthau. It compares verbatim excerpts from his book “Ambassador Morgenthau’s Story”, with what he had written on the very same matter in his personal diary kept by him and/or his secretary Hagop Andonian daily, noting the important events. Where necessary, other “neutral documents” are quoted to show that Morgenthau’s Book, is an “excellent book of boasting, diversions and inexplicable lies” he introduced in 1918 by this book (almost four years after the events happened) to create a document damning Turks and Germans, to give “a humane cause” to USA to take part in WW1. Mr. Morgenthau’s Diary written in his hand writing (or his secretary’s) belies the polished words written in his book (by the Pulitzer prize winner ghost writer Burton Hendrick, putting words in mouths as if they were copied from a sound recorder).

Labels: Book REVIEW, Sukru AYA

Important Reminder:  See three articles by Mehmet Perincek in Turkish-English giving new information about Morgenthau from Russian archives-link: 
http://armenians-1915.blogspot.com/2012/11/3378-what-did-talat-pasha-speak-with.html

Greeks Driving The Cyprus Issue Off The Rails

After the passage of eight years since the April 24, 2004 Annan plan referendum it is now clearly visible that the side punished by the international community is the Turkish Cypriots, who voted “yes,” rather than the Greek Cypriots, who rejected the plan. It can be observed that the international isolation and embargo of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (KKTC) and of the Turkish Cypriots is still on with hopes for finding a solution to the Cyprus problem becoming increasingly slim.

 

The Greek Cypriot administration, with the assurance of being a full member and sitting on the decision-making side of Turkey’s EU accession talks — currently going off track — suggests a possible solution under the auspices of the UN.

Greek Foreign Minister, with an active and tough attitude toward the Cyprus problem, declared the Annan plan to be in the depths of the history, somewhere untouchable.

 

Turkey’s “Cyprus Action Plan” dated Jan. 24, 2006 aimed to form a basis for a solution, but was turned down by the Greek Cypriot administration and Greece in the first instance. The attitude of the international community toward the Greeks’ position concerning the April 24 referendum was that of “mutual understanding,” further boosting the Greek disagreement.

 

The leader of the Greek Cypriot administration, Demetris Christofias, is now talking about the abandonment not only of the Annan plan but also of a federal solution on the island, giving signals that his final target is a “unitary state in Cyprus.”

 

Different surveys held in Greek Cyprus recently revealed the drop of support for AKEL. The consistent increase in opposition to AKEL and the stability of the support given to Anastasiades reveals that the Greek Cypriot people think differently from their today’s leader or the existing Greek Cypriot administration.

 

The latest bargaining chip nowadays is the “Natural gas”. The Greek Cypriots concocted this to erase the negative sentiments originating from their unwillingness in the negotiations. They grasped it like a political lifeline to keep their heads above water.

 

The trespass of the Greek Cypriot Police to the territories of TRNC proved how necessary is forming the joint central authorities, to handle the disputes, criminals, forest fires, water shortage, electric blackouts and similar joint interests in both sides.

 

If the two peoples of the island cannot come to an agreement on humanitarian problems, how then will they solve the Cyprus problem, which stretching back to 1796 and the Megali Idea.

 

 

Ata ATUN

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October 17 2012

Other Face of Cyprus Problem

The conflict in Cyprus did not begin in mid 1950’s but began with an idea called Enosis, unification of Cyprus with Greece.

 

This idea was seeded in Cyprus as early as 1879, when the British allowed Greeks to settle on the island in “patriotic communities.” Soon after, Greek patriotism flourished in the island and sneaked into churches and schools. The actual roots of Cyprus problem goes back as far as to late 1800’s but not 1974.

 

Since early 1900’s, the Greek Cypriots were geared for Enosis and opposed to the coexistence of Turkish Cypriots. 

In 1959 the motherlands of both people and Britain provided Cyprus with a constitution that was not only agreed upon by all parties, but also provided for the existence of a Republic, where Turks and Greeks would have equal rights and a say over their own people.

 

Most people talk about Greek Cypriot sufferings as a result of the coup d’etat that overthrew Makarios and from Turkey’s intervention, but it seems they have no idea about the Turkish Cypriots sufferings.

 

Their knowledge is in lack of the period prior to the 1974 intervention, where the Greek Cypriots were orchestrating genocidal policies against Turkish Cypriots over a period of eleven years, starting from 1963.

 During this notorious period, 103 Turkish Cypriot villages were completely destroyed and hundreds of Turkish Cypriots massacred and buried in mass graves by the Greek Cypriots.

 

Under the Akritas Plan, which it’s drafting was completed as early as 1961, the Greek Cypriots sought to annihilate the entire Turkish Cypriot population on Cyprus and accordingly attacks to Turkish Cypriots started on December 20, 1963. This atrocious night is known as “Bloody Christmas”, in Turkish Cypriot history and over 600 innocent Turkish Cypriot men, women, and children were ruthlessly slaughtered in one single night .

 

As a result of such grave human rights abuses, the Turkish Cypriots were forced to withdraw into small enclaves, almost 60,000 Turkish Cypriots left their homes, belongings, memories and sheltered in safe areas to save their lives. In these enclaves their fundamental human rights were severely restricted and they lived out their lives as refugees within their own country. They had no access to most of life’s basic necessities, had no political representation, and were exposed to constant violence and harassment regulated by the Greek Cypriot leadership.

 

 The goal of the Greek Cypriot leadership under Makarios, was to force all Turkish Cypriots off of the island, either by brute force or by implementation of inhuman living conditions.

 

But the pace of Makarios for ethnic cleansing of Turkish Cypriots was not fast enough for the Junta Generals in Greece and this led to the Greek Cypriot National Guards overthrowing Makarios in a coup d’etat on July 15, 1974, under the command of Greek officers and support of Greek troops from Greece.

 

From this point onwards, things changed dramatically in the island. Turkey had to intervene to save the lives of Turkish Cypriots, as the speed of the genocide would get accelerated, after the declaration of “Cyprus Hellenic Republic” in July 16, 1974, by the notorious human butcher Nichos Sampson, a right wing Greek operative, installed by the Greek junta as the president to the unilaterally declared new republic.

 

It is a solid fact that the Turkish Cypriots had been struggling for ages to live in peace in the island but instead, forced by their adver-saries to rely on the armed forces and get cohered to their motherland Turkey.

 

Ata ATUN

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September 21, 2012

Cyprus: The complete history from 1960 to 1974 (1-8)

The Journal of Turkish weekly, Janury 15, 2008

http://www.turkishweekly.net/news/51485/cyprus-the-complete-history-from-1960-to-1974-1-8-.html

 

 

Tuesday, 15 January 2008

* By Ata ATUN

 

(Section 1-8)

 

Cyprus gained her sovereign independence by virtue of a constitution and three treaties — the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance and the Treaty of Establishment, all of which came into force on the same day — Aug. 16, 1960. They were interrelated so that, for example, the 48 “basic articles” of the Constitution were incorporated into the Treaty of Guarantee while the two Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance were in turn mentioned to “have constitutional force” in Article 181 of the constitution. The third treaty, the Treaty of Establishment, makes it clear that the boundaries of the Republic of Cyprus do not coincide with those of the island, in that Britain retains absolute sovereignty over two enclaves, totaling 99 square miles which contain the military bases of Ağrotur (Akrotiri) and Dikelya (Dhekelia). Britain is also given certain military rights (such as exclusive control of the Nicosia airport in the event of an emergency) on the territory of the republic. The constitution was drawn up explicitly in terms of the two people — and was referred to subsequently by the Turkish Cypriots as a functional federation, though that expression does not actually appear. The official languages were Greek and Turkish. The Greek and Turkish flags could be flown without any restrictions, though there was also to be a national flag. The Greek and Turkish national holidays were to be observed. The country was defined as “an independent and sovereign republic with a presidential regime, the president being Greek and the vice president being Turkish elected by the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus respectively.” There were 10 ministers, seven chosen by the president and three by the vice president (in practice a Turkish Cypriot was appointed to defense). Decisions in the Council of Ministers were to be taken by absolute majority, except that either the president or the vice president had an absolute veto over decisions relating to foreign affairs, defense or internal security and a delaying one on other matters.

The legislative system was unicameral. The House of Representatives had 50 members: 35 Greek and 15 Turkish. This ratio was unilaterally changed to 56 Greek and 24 Turkish by Greek Cypriots without the consent of Turkish Cypriots during the “Dark Era,” namely between the years 1963-1974. According to Article 78(2), “any law imposing duties or taxes shall require a simple majority of the representatives elected by the Greek and Turkish communities respectively taking part in the vote.” This provision also applied to any change in the electoral law and the adoption of any law relating to the municipalities. This last question baffled the constitution makers. In five of the towns, separate Greek and Turkish municipalities had emerged as a consequence of the communal confrontations of 1958 and had been recognized by the British. They would now be officially established, thereby becoming the only organ of the constitution based on the idea of territorial separation, but for only four years during which the president and the vice president were supposed to decide between them whether they were to continue.

 

Legislation on other subjects was to take place by simple majority but again the president and the vice president had the same right of veto — absolute on foreign affairs, defense and internal security, delaying on other matters — as in the Council of Ministers. Outside the House of Representatives there were to be elected two communal chambers, one Greek, the other Turkish, which were given separate functions not entrusted to the House. These included education, religious matters, personal status, sport, culture, producer and consumer cooperatives and credit establishments. For these purposes they were entitled to impose taxes, set up courts and conduct their own relations with the Greek and Turkish governments over help with funds or with personnel. The judicial system was headed both by the Supreme Constitutional Court and by the High Court of Justice, each consisting of Greek and Turkish Cypriot judges, each with a neutral president (who should not be Cypriot, Greek, Turkish or British). The High Court had mainly appellate jurisdiction but could also deal with “offences against the constitution and the constitutional order.” The Supreme Constitutional Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the allocation of functions and powers between the various institutions. Either president or vice president might appeal to this court whenever he thought that a law including, specifically, the budget, would have the effect of discriminating against one of the communities. Moreover human rights were strongly protected. A long series of guarantees against discrimination and in support of fundamental rights and liberties (Articles 6 to 35) were closely based on the appropriate European conventions. Finally, the constitution recognized the bi-communal nature of Cyprus in its arrangements for administration. The public service should approximate in all grades of its hierarchy to a 70:30 ratio. The Public Service Commission was to consist of 10 members, seven of them Greek, but a number of decisions were made dependent on the approval of at least two of the Turkish members.

 

There was to be a Cypriot army, 2,000 strong, of which 1,200 should be Greeks and 800 Turks, together with security forces, comprising police and gendarmerie, also totaling 2,000, but this time with 1,400 Greeks to 600 Turks; forces stationed in parts of the republic inhabited almost totally by one community should have policemen drawn entirely from that community.

 

***

 

A first reaction to this document must be that for a nation of 556,000, this was a very elaborate and very rigid constitution. It runs to 199 articles and of these the 48 “basic” ones were to remain unalterable in perpetuity.

The remainder could in practice only be altered by mutual agreement of the two communities. Drafted with the help of a Swiss constitutional adviser, the constitution was of the consociational variety which gives the preservation of the ethnic balance higher priority than majority rule.

Moreover the constitution, thus heavily freighted, was screwed into the international system by the accompanying treaties. Under the Treaty of Guarantee with Britain, Greece and Turkey, the Republic of Cyprus undertakes to uphold its own independence and its own constitution; not to participate in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever; and to prohibit any domestic action likely to promote union with another state or partition. In return Britain, Greece and Turkey recognize and guarantee not only the independence, integrity and security of Cyprus but also “the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.” They also will ban activity favoring “Enosis or Taksim” (union or division). In the event of a breach of the provisions of the treaty, the three guarantors “will consult together” about “measures necessary to ensure observance.” Then follows the most critical wording of the treaty, currently cited to support the Turkish position. If, says, Article IV, concerted action should not be possible, “each of the three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by this present Treaty.”

 

The Treaty of Alliance, which was between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, thus not including Britain, was intended to reinforce the rationale of the whole series of arrangements: that Greco-Turkish friendship was in the last resort worth more than the strict arithmetic and practical convenience of Cypriot politics. A committee of the three foreign ministers was “the supreme political body” of the alliance. Under its authority there should be a tripartite headquarters established on the island, with military contingents of 950 Greeks and 650 Turks to provide for the defense of the new republic and to train the new Cypriot army

 

The extent to which this complex of arrangements, redolent of old-fashioned diplomacy, was legally valid in the light of the United Nations Charter has been the subject of much debate among international lawyers. The question was whether a constitution so rigid and unalterable was compatible with the equal sovereignty which was recognized in the charter and whether its unchangeable nature could validly be enforced under a treaty which permitted any one of the signatories individually to take action.

 

It is a complex argument which has not been resolved.

 

Certainly Professor Ernst Forsthoff, the German who was the first president of the Supreme Constitutional Court, was to say [in 1963]: “I consider it wrong to regard Cyprus under the present agreement and constitution as an independent state.” The guarantees, he added, “include also a right of actual intervention — there can be no guarantee without the right of intervention.” Clearly the signatories, it may be presumed, thought they were signing valid documents. Archbishop Makarios subsequently claimed that the settlement was imposed on him by force majeure and that he did not feel morally bound by it.

 

Archbishop Makarios was elected the first president of Cyprus by the Greek voters in December 1959 and Dr. Fazil K+-+ğ+-k the first vice president by the Turks. The archbishop had critics both on the right from supporters of Grivas — who left the island for a hero’s welcome in Athens and the rank of a retired general — and on the left because the settlement had been brought under the aegis of NATO. He moved swiftly to consolidate his position — by appointing EOKA people to key positions, most notably Polycarpos Yorgadjis as minister of the interior, and by launching a vigorous foreign policy of friendship with the non-aligned powers which served to disarm the potential opposition of the communists in AKEL who were given five unopposed members in the first House. But the same process of satisfying the political needs of the Greek Cypriot community straightaway led to a series of conflicts with the Turks, in which the feelings of the two communities about the constitution were made plain.

 

The Greek Cypriots’ feeling was that the constitutional privileges accorded the Turkish community were preposterous; the Turkish Cypriots’ that these were the bare minimum, to be exercised to the last ounce.

 

The disputes concerned:

 

(a) The 70:30 ratio in the public service: The Turkish Cypriots required that the proportion should be attained within five months of independence as had in fact been stipulated in a pre-independence agreement between the president-elect and the vice president-elect.

 

The Greek Cypriots in the Public Service Commission argued that they could not draw from 18 percent of the population which was poorly qualified suitable candidates to fill 30 percent of the jobs overnight. After three years the Greek Cypriots published figures to show that real progress had been made in all grades towards the objective. But the subject rankled and aroused resentment in both communities. At the end of 1963 there were 2,000 appeals outstanding in the Supreme Constitutional Court about public appointments.

 

***

 

(b) Taxes: Since a majority vote of Turkish deputies in the House was needed to pass tax legislation, Turkish Cypriots sought to use this as leverage to force compliance over the 70:30 ratio, over legislation for separate municipalities and a more generous approach towards the grant of subsidies to the Turkish Communal Chamber.

As a result the colonial income tax law expired whereupon Makarios ordered that existing taxes should continue to be collected. In December 1961 the government at last came out with its own proposals, but whereas the Greeks wanted a permanent law, the Turks wanted it to be renewable annually, which would enable them to use their bargaining power each session. Since there was again deadlock, the personal income tax was abandoned by the House and the Greek Cypriots enacted it instead through the Greek Communal Chamber.

(c) The Cypriot army: The minister of defense, who was a Turkish Cypriot, proposed an army of five battalions, each composed of three companies. At the battalion level they should be mixed, but at the company level the units should be from one community or the other. The majority of the Cabinet decided that on the contrary the units should be mixed at every level. On this issue the vice president used his power of final veto. The president therefore decided not to have an army at all.

 

(d) Separate municipalities: Existing colonial laws had to be extended eight times while Greeks and Turks conducted a dialogue of the deaf about whether fresh legislation should establish separate municipalities as the constitution required and the Turks demanded. In December 1962 the Greek majority rejected further continuation of the status quo. The Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber then purported to confirm the position of the Turkish municipalities while the Council of Ministers fell back on a pre-1959 colonial law to replace all the existing elected municipalities by appointed development boards. The president offered Turkish Cypriots compensation safeguards but made it quite clear that he had no intention of implementing the provisions of the constitution which he regarded as opening the way to partition.

 

(e) The status of the vice president: Dr. Fazil K+-+ğ+-k complained that since he had an absolute veto over foreign policy, he should be told what that policy was about. Spyros Kyprianou, the foreign minister, was not, he said, showing him the papers. He objected strongly to Makarios adopting on his own a policy of non-alignment and going to the Belgrade non-aligned summit without his approval.

 

The record of the first three years of the new republic could not therefore be described as an unqualified success. The necessary restraint on both sides if such a delicate mechanism of checks and balances is to work or, alternatively, if by informal arrangements it is to be short-circuited, was absent. Already by the end of 1961 the Turkish language press was calling for an intervention by Turkey, Greece and Britain and the resignation of Archbishop Makarios over the income tax issue.

 

The question of whether President Makarios ever meant the 1960 constitution to work or whether from the outset his acceptance of it was a maneuver first to obtain independence and then to clear the ground for union with Greece is still highly controversial. As an archbishop he was predisposed to see the whole island as Hellenic. In both his capacities he took part throughout the remainder of his career in what is called “verbal republicanism,” namely the celebration of anniversaries of heroic deaths during the war against the Britis with many references to his own fidelity to the cause for which they had died, specifically the cause of enosis. But to what extent and at what periods this sentiment was purely verbal it is rather difficult to say .

 

Certainly there are many Greek Cypriots who think that Makarios did for a time support the constitution until he concluded that, unless amended, it was unworkable. Turkish Cypriots rather naturally call attention to a confidential document called the Akritas Plan, which was later published in the Greek press. (Patris Newspaper, Feb. 7, 1967).

 

This, which is generally thought to have been circulated in great secrecy by Polycarpos Yorgadjis, the minister of the interior, lays down a scenario according to which the “negative elements” in the constitution should be stressed in public while lavish use should be made of such internationally acceptable concepts as “self-determination” and “minority rights” to describe the case for amending it. By this means Cyprus would win control over her own institutions and thus effectively nullify the Treaty of Guarantee since the constitution it was to guarantee would by then be no more.

 

The Turkish Cypriots had made some preparation for a breakdown since they were determined that independence should not mean, as Rauf Denktaş put it, “a change of colonial masters for the worse.” But many of the Turkish Cypriot political leaders counted on the constitution to settle down. They were encouraged in this by the first Turkish ambassador to Nicosia, Emin Dirvana, who was a philhellene and who tended to discount the warnings of Denktaş, the president of the Turkish Communal Chamber of the era, who claimed through intelligence sources to know better. According to Denktaş, who was political adviser to the Turkish Defense Organization (TMT), most of that organization had been stood down and there were only 40 active members in it when the fighting started.

 

***

 

Polycarpos Yorgadjis, a man who ran his ministry as if he were still in EOKA and who attracted to himself attributions of the most intricate plotting, used the constitutional breakdown over tax collection as an excuse for getting Makarios’s authority for building up a “secret army” of ex-EOKA men. There were also other freelance gangs of armed irregulars on the Greek side.

On Nov. 30, 1963, President Makarios wrote to Vice President Dr. Fazıl K+-+ğ+-k proposing 13 amendments to the constitution which, he said, would “remove obstacles to the smooth functioning and development of the state.” He did so apparently with the knowledge and encouragement of the British high commissioner, Sir Arthur Clarke, whether personally or officially is not clear: The full story of this remains obscure. Taken together, the amendments would have had the effect of resolving all outstanding issues in the Greek favor.

 

TÀ The president and vice president would lose the right of veto.

 

TÀ The necessity for separate majorities of Greek and Turkish members for the passage of certain laws, including taxes, to be cancelled.

 

TÀ No separate municipalities.

 

TÀ The ratio in the public services and in the army and police would be the same as the ratio of population.

 

TÀ The Public Service Commission would be smaller and take decisions by a simple majority.

 

TÀ The separate Greek Communal Chamber would be abolished.

 

TÀ The administration of justice would be unified so that a Greek could not demand to be tried by a Greek judge and a Turk by a Turkish judge.

 

It must be said in favor of these proposals that they streamlined the administration and removed many of the features that laid stress on whether a Cypriot citizen was Greek or Turkish.

 

But from the Turkish Cypriot point of view they removed almost all the props to their claim to be the “co-founders” of the republic and demoted them to the status of a minority. In the view of Greek Cypriot constitutional lawyer Polyvios Polyviou, who is a sharp critic of the 1960 constitution, the course followed by the archbishop was “a grievous error” which “could not but have appeared to the Turkish Cypriots as a dangerous development that might change the internal balance of power and be taken internationally as a sign that the bi-communal nature of the state was giving way to unitary and majority principles.” In Polyviou’s opinion it would have been much better to have tried to change things gradually; a view shared at the time by the Greek government which, not having been warned in advance, told Makarios that if he had asked their advice it would have been against.

 

The archbishop’s proposals were hastily rejected by the vice president, Dr. K+-+ğ+-k, and by the government of Turkey, as one of the guarantors of the RoC. The atmosphere after the presentation of the 13 proposals was very tense, with the Turkish Cypriots interpreting the move as a preparation to slide into enosis. On Dec. 21, 1963 a street brawl in a Turkish quarter in Nicosia between a Turkish Cypriot crowd and Yorgadjis’ plainclothes special constables was followed immediately by a major Greek Cypriot attack by the various paramilitary forces against the Turks in Tahtakala region at Nicosia and in Larnaca. At first an attempt to calm the situation was made jointly by the President Makarios and the vice president K+-+ğ+-k and by other leaders, but it had clearly gotten out of hand and in any case the ex-EOKA element was strong in the security forces.

 

Although the TMT organized the defense of the Turkish minority and there were a number of acts of retaliation directed at the Greek Cypriots, there is no doubt that the main victims of the numerous incidents that took place during the next few months were Turkish Cypriots. Seven hundred Turkish Cypriot hostages, including women and children, were seized in the northern suburbs of Nicosia. During the first half of 1964, fighting continued to flare up between neighboring villages. One hundred ninety-one Turkish Cypriots and 133 Greeks were known to have been killed while it was claimed 209 Turks and 41 Greeks remained missing and could also be presumed dead.

 

There was much looting and destruction of Turkish villages. Some 20,000 refugees fled from them, many of them taking refuge in Kyrenia and Hamitk+Ây (Hamid Mandres) of Nicosia. Twenty-four wholly Turkish villages and Turkish houses in 72 mixed villages were abandoned. Houses were demolished by the Greeks with the intention of destroying the hopes of Turkish Cypriots returning one day. Food, clothing, medical supplies and monetary aid to the immigrants were organized immediately by Turkey, one of the guarantors of the RoC, and shipped in. Most of the evacuation seems to have been after planned Greek assaults, with the people leaving clothing, furniture, food, machinery and hopes behind. But in some cases orders were received for the people to immigrate safely to Turkish Cypriot areas before any expected Greek Cypriot assaults took place. The partition of the island inevitably started after these Greek assaults.

 

***

 

In Nicosia the guarantors — Turkey, the United Kingdom and Greece — began to move over the Christmas week of 1963. The 650-man Turkish army contingent in Cyprus under the terms of the Treaty of Alliance moved out of its barracks and positioned itself astride the Nicosia-Kyrenia road in Ortak+Ây (Ortakeuy).

Turkish jets from the mainland buzzed Nicosia. The Turkish fleet set sail for Cyprus. President Makarios, by now alarmed that a Turkish army might indeed land, agreed that the British should intervene from the sovereign bases in order to avoid a worse situation. This produced a cease-fire in Nicosia, an exchange of hostages and the establishment of a “Green Line,” a neutral zone between the Greek and Turkish quarters in the capital which has existed till the present day. Turkish Cypriots expelled from their side of that line the entire Armenian community of Nicosia on the grounds that it had aligned itself with the Greek position.

What the guarantors did not do was carry out the one purpose for which they existed: the restoration of the 1960 constitution. The establishment of the Green Line brought peace to Nicosia, though not yet to other places, but it did not bring the fractured government together.Greek and Turkish Cypriot ministers remained on opposite sides of the line.

 

According to the Turkish Cypriot thesis, there was, from this time on, no legal government in Cyprus — only provisional bodies on both sides pending the establishment of a new legal order — the old one having been overthrown by force. Turkish Cypriot deputies and all the Turkish Cypriot civil servants were removed from their posts in Cyprus’ government by brute force and never allowed to return.

 

According to the Greek Cypriot thesis, there continued to be a legitimate and democratically elected government representing the great majority of the people which had, as many ex-colonial countries were doing, asserted its right to gain control of its institutions and had done so at a time, moreover, when the Turkish Cypriot vice president and ministers had willfully continued to absent themselves.

 

At a conference in London of the three guarantor states and the two Cypriot communities, Makarios demanded the termination of the 1960 agreements as unworkable and their replacement by “unfettered independence,” a unitary Greek government with freedom to amend the constitution. He offered the Turkish Cypriots minority rights, which as usual they rejected out of hand. The Turks said that the December fighting proved that the two communities should be physically separated. Consequently they demanded a fully federal state of Cyprus with a border between Turkish and Greek provinces known as the Attila line, which is not unlike the present cease-fire line, or, failing that, “double enosis” which would bring a frontier across Cyprus between Greece and Turkey themselves, both solutions that would imply a population transfer.

 

The London conference broke down with no chance of agreement. Greek Cypriots preferred to hold their position of being the only recognized government of Cyprus internationally and did not fancy sharing the power with Turkish Cypriots.While the cease-fire held in Nicosia, the British were unable to prevent Greek Cypriots from attacking Turkish Cypriots at Limassol, Larnaca and Paphos, causing widespread casualties and damage.

 

Turkey announced for the second time that her fleet was sailing for Cyprus and the British, desperately anxious not to get bogged down in another Cyprus conflict, insisted on the peace-keeping burden being shared. Aiming above all at preventing a clash between two NATO partners, but wanting to keep the dispute within the NATO family, the United States tried to organize a NATO intervention, but Makarios would not consider it. It was necessary after all to bring in the United Nations. By the March 4, 1964 Security Council resolution, UNFICYP (UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus) and a UN mediator were set up and despite a further severe Turkish warning, the danger passed. Makarios interpreted the UN resolution as recognizing “unfettered independence,” which he sought, and appointed Greek Cypriot ministers to take over the Turkish portfolios and the seized state to be the only recognized government of Cyprus.The UN force which was set up and remains till the present day was originally of over 6,000 men and is now [2008] about 750. It has always had a substantial British contingent, often over 1,000, but quite few at present, making it unusual among UN forces which normally exclude contingents from the permanent members of the Security Council.

 

It has achieved a good deal but not what was expected of it by either side since, as is usual with peace-keeping operations, it does not use force except in self-defense.The force’s main deterrent was its presence. By use of persuasion they were able to prevent many killings that would almost certainly have happened, but they could not be everywhere and they could not stop a determined attack. In the first few months the UN had the greatest difficulty in getting a purchase on events because there were repeated outbreaks of fighting in different parts of the island.

 

Since there was no Cypriot Army, President Makarios now formed a National Guard, Ethniki Fruro, introducing conscription and ignoring the veto of Vice President K+-+ğ+-k. Arms supplies came in from Czechoslovakia and a Greek general from the mainland took command.

 

***

 

The articles published in my column under the titles “Cyprus: The complete history from 1960 to 1974” and “Cyprus’ history from 1960 to 1974” on Dec. 17, 24, 29, and 31 of 2007 and Jan. 5 and 7 of 2008 were unintentionally taken in part from “The Cyprus Conflict, the Main Narrative,” written by the late British journalist and historian Keith Kyle and Professor William Hale

The complete article can be read on the Internet at http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main.htm and http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/narrative-main-%203.htm. Part of “The Cyprus Conflict, The Main Narrative,” written by Kyle, is excerpted from the book “Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774-2000,” London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000, authored by Professor Hale.

 

The first paragraph of the “The Cyprus Conflict” published on the Internet is as follows:

 

“A narrative is a descriptive account of what happened over a period of time. In any complex history, there may be many competing narratives, and these will vary according to the competence, bias, resources or goals of the narrator. Every historical document, even scholarship, will suffer from some bias or incompleteness. In Cyprus, each community has its own quasi-official narrative, relaying and justifying its interpretation of events in the light of current political discourse. These aspects of narratives are discussed elsewhere in this site, in the section titled ‘Historiography & Nationalism.’

 

“This main narrative was authored by Keith Kyle, a distinguished British journalist and historian, who wrote this in 1983 for the Minority Rights Group, an independent human-rights organization in London. Kyle’s narrative is a balanced, well-researched history, and provides an excellent axis for all the documents on the site. The final segment of the main narrative was authored by William Hale, a British scholar. ”

 

This narrative tells the true story of the Cyprus issue as written by an unbiased journalist and authored by an unbiased academician, making it very reliable, academic and citable.

 

I offer my appreciation to Kyle and Hale for their research and publication and to the Minority Rights Group for requesting and financing such a high-quality and priceless work, detailing in depth the Cyprus issue, which has caused many hidden and suppressed facts to surface.

 

The above-mentioned book and the excerpted narrative will play a significant role and will serve as a reliable source of reference for scholars, bureaucrats and politicians in their hard work on the road to finding a solution to the long-lasting Cyprus dispute.

 

To understand the main causes, or the roots, of the Cyprus dispute, more unbiased information other than pro-Greek publications should also be read. I recommend all my readers who are interested in the detailed facts on the Cyprus dispute or who are researching the Cyprus problem in depth to obtain this book or visit the Web sites provided above.

 

The 1960 Republic of Cyprus agreements were based on equality and partnership between the two peoples for the independence and sovereignty of the island. The 1960 Constitution required a joint presence and effective participation on both sides in all aspects of the state to be legitimate.

Neither community had the right to rule over the other, nor could one of the communities claim to govern the other. The aim of the basic articles of both the constitution and subsequent treaties was to safeguard the rights of the two peoples as equals.

 

It was hoped that the two peoples of the island and their new partners would be able to live peacefully together under this new political partnership.

 

It soon became obvious that this was not going to be possible. It became clear that the Greek Cypriots and Greece did not intend to abide by the constitution. They did not give up their ambition for the annexation of the island to Greece, and the Greek Cypriot leadership sought to unlawfully bring about constitutional changes.

 

The only way the Greek Cypriots could achieve their aims was to destroy the legitimate order by the use of force and to take over the joint state. The rule of law collapsed on the island in 1963 after Greek Cypriot militia attacks on Turkish Cypriot communities across the island, killing many men, women and children. Around 270 mosques, shrines and other places of worship were desecrated. An inhuman Turkish Cypriot genocide took place on the island during the “Dark Age,” 1963-1974. The constitution became unworkable because of the refusal on the part of the Greek Cypriots to fulfill the obligations to which they had agreed.

 

The bi-national republic that was imagined by the treaties ceased to exist after December 1963. The Greek Cypriot wing of the “partnership” state took over the title of the “Government of Cyprus,” and the Turkish Cypriots, who had never accepted the seizure of power, set up a Turkish administration to run their own affairs.

 

In the end, the Greek Cypriot state was internationally recognized under the title of the “Government of Cyprus” and brought into the EU, while the Turkish Cypriots were forced in 1985 to unilaterally declare their own administration under the name of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,” which still is not internationally recognized.

 

The two main peoples on Cyprus, the Turks and the Greeks, share no common language besides English, no common religion and no common literature, nor have they, except on the surface, shared any common culture, from the past up until the present.

 

A “United Cyprus” or “Cypriot Nation” is a utopian idea that has no hope of realization.

 

***

 

Conscription does not cover Christian minorities on the island: the Armenians, Maronites and Roman Catholics (the Latins). Male Greek Cypriots in the 18 to 49 age range were required to serve in the newly established “Greek National Guard.”

Young men planning to complete their undergraduate and graduate studies abroad and fresh graduates from the local Greek Cypriot high schools, academies and English schools were forced to serve in the Greek Cypriot National Guard before commencing their undergraduate studies.

 

The arms of the Ethniki Froura, the Cypriot National Guard, were obtained from the Cyprus Army’s Greek regiment, deployed by Greece according to the 1960 agreements and treaties. The commander general of the National Guard and high-ranking officers were sent from Greece. All Turkish Cypriot privates, sergeants and officers in the Cyprus Army were disarmed and detained on the eve of Dec. 21, 1963.

 

Ignoring the three guarantors — Turkey, Britain and Greece — and the legality of the 1960 Agreements and Treaties of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, the then president of the government of Cyprus, declared the existing 1960 Constitution “null and void” on Jan. 1, 1963, only eight days after the first organized assaults on Turkish Cypriots. His aim was to use his illegal assaults on Turkish Cypriots in a way to pave the way to enosis (the reunification of Greece and Cyprus), through inter-communal clashes which Turkish Cypriots would be blamed, accused of rebelling against the government of Cyprus.

 

While Makarios was quite busy with organizing assaults on Turkish Cypriots and giving orders to his comrades to draw an effective extermination plan which would lead to enosis in the long run, in Greece George Papandreou was in power and busy with detailing the “Greek National Center,” aiming to give full support to Makarios on his so-called “struggle for enosis.”

 

The aim of the “Greek National Center” was to defend the Greek island of Cyprus if Turkey dared to attack. Papandreou took the responsibility and the initiative.

 

Accordingly, the generals in the National Army of Greece drafted a plan to sneak in troops and arms to Cyprus. As if the Greek Cypriot government had no idea at all of this clandestine operation, shipments of arms and troops in huge amounts lasted for four months. The first wave of Greek troops and officers stepped onto the soil of Cyprus on the night of April 17, 1964. By the end of July 1964, around 20,000 soldiers and officers with ammunition and arms enough for an army of 40,000 successfully infiltrated the island, without the knowledge of the UN peace keeping force and guarantors of the island except Greece, who was the organizer.

 

ASDAK (Cyprus Supreme Defense Military Command) and EMEK (Special Mixed Staff Cyprus) were established immediately in 1963. EMEK transformed into GEEF (General Staff of the Cyprus National Guard) in 1964. (http://www.army.gov.cy/eldyk/enhmerotiko.pdf)

 

Greek Cypriot newspaper To Vima, on Feb. 7, 1999, printed the disclosures of Gen. George Karousos, which gives official and reliable information on this clandestine transfer of troops from Greece to Cyprus. So does Kathimerini, another local Greek Cypriot newspaper, in its issue dated February 2002.

 

Andreas Papandreou, the then Prime Minister of Greece, clearly details this ingenious and unlawful “sneak in” operation in his memoirs, titled “Democracy at Gunpoint.”

 

The Greek education system also lists this clandestine transfer and places it on April 17, 1964. It names the event the “Secret deployment of Greek Division in Cyprus.” (http://www.netschoolbook.gr/cal4.html)

 

In June 1964 the National Assembly unanimously accepted Act No. 20, on the establishment of the Cypriot National Guard, which also allowed employment of Greek officers from mainland Greece to train the Cypriot National Guard and to serve in the Cypriot armed forces as well.

 

***

 

The Turkish Cypriots, after severe inter-communal armed clashes, began moving from isolated rural areas and mixed villages into safe enclaves to save their lives, leaving behind all of their wealth, property, houses, memories and graveyards. In just a short time a substantial portion of the island’s Turkish Cypriot population were crowded into the suburbs of the Turkish quarter of Lefkosa in tents and hastily constructed shacks. Slum conditions resulted from lack of money. All necessities and necessary utilities were sent by the Red Cross from mainland Turkey. The Greek Cypriot government took no notice of these harsh conditions or the refugees. Many Turkish Cypriots who had stayed in their homes in safe Turkish areas, shared their land, houses, food and water for the security and welfare of the refugees.

Spurred by the screams and non-stop calls for help of the Turkish Cypriots, Turkey decided to step in and do something.

 

Archbishop Makarios had not taken into consideration the protests and warnings coming from Turkey. He believed that Turkey would not attempt a military intervention and but would protest only. Accordingly, the assaults on Turkish Cypriots increased day by day and got bloodier.

 

In June 1964, İsmet İn+Ân+-, then-prime minister of Turkey, decided on a military intervention. US President Lyndon Johnson barely managed to stop the Turkish army, which had already sailed from the port of Mersin destined for Cyprus.

 

The diplomatic note sent by Johnson to İn+Ân+- demanding a stop to the expedition deeply damaged Turkish-American relations, which had been improving since 1950. But this brutal note put a stop to any improvements. Suddenly anti-American sentiment fell into the hearts of the Turkish people and numerous protest rallies were held in Turkey’s major cities.

 

The Turkish Cypriot administration decided to establish a Turkish-controlled area on the northern shores of the island to bring in food, medicine, clothing, arms and other supplies from Turkey over the sea and officially asked for help from the Turkish government, which eventually volunteered its assistance.

 

The Turkish government, highly disappointed by Johnson’s diplomatic note, decided to send Turkish Cypriot students pursuing undergraduate studies in Turkey to a beachhead at Erenk+Ây (Kokkina) on the northern shore of the island, northwest of G+-zelyurt Bay (Morfou Bay), rather than sending in professional Turkish troops.

 

The transportation of these students in groups of not more than 12, by small fishing boats, from Anamur to Erenk+Ây, began on March 30, 1964 and ended after countless trips in early August. A total of 322 students were carried to the beachhead. A further 200 local Turkish Cypriot volunteers joined this group and the number of these amateur fighters rose to 522. They had very limited arms and ammunition, just enough to defend their entrenchments.

 

Meanwhile, Georgios Grivas used the popularity he gained in era of the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters to coerce Makarios and the Greek government into allowing him to return to Cyprus. He returned to Cyprus in June 1964 to take over the command of the Greek Cypriot forces organized under the National Guard as well as the Greek military division sent to Cyprus by the Greek government of George Papandreou to assist in the extermination of the Turkish Cypriots.

 

Grivas rapidly took over the Greek Cypriot National Guard and restored discipline. Noting that possession of the beachhead at Erenk+Ây was enabling the Turkish Cypriots to bring in food, medicine, clothing, arms and students from Turkey, he decided to organize a heavy attack on Erenk+Ây with an infantry of 5,000 on Aug. 6, 1964. His plan was to reach the shore within two hours and exterminate the Turkish Cypriot beachhead.

 

He felt so assured of victory that days before he invited civilians to the area for a joyful spectacle with a public invitation in the newspapers.

 

The result was a disaster. On Aug. 8, the mighty Greek Cypriot force had to retreat with countless wounded and dead, leaving behind most of their armory.

 

15 January 2008

 

 

Tuesday, 15 January 2008

 

By Ata ATUN 

To be continued Part 9 and Part 10