A first reaction to this document must be that for a nation of 556,000, this was a very elaborate and very rigid constitution. It runs to 199 articles and of these the 48 “basic” ones were to remain unalterable in perpetuity.
The remainder could in practice only be altered by mutual agreement of the two communities. Drafted with the help of a Swiss constitutional adviser, the constitution was of the consociational variety which gives the preservation of the ethnic balance higher priority than majority rule.
Moreover the constitution, thus heavily freighted, was screwed into the international system by the accompanying treaties. Under the Treaty of Guarantee with Britain, Greece and Turkey, the Republic of Cyprus undertakes to uphold its own independence and its own con-stitution; not to participate in any political or economic union with any state whatsoever; and to prohibit any domestic action likely to promote union with another state or partition. In return Britain, Greece and Turkey recognize and guarantee not only the independence, integrity and security of Cyprus but also “the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution.” They also will ban activity favoring “Enosis or Taksim” (union or division). In the event of a breach of the provisions of the treaty, the three guarantors “will consult together” about “measures necessary to ensure observance.” Then follows the most critical wording of the treaty, currently cited to support the Tur-kish position. If, says, Article IV, concerted action should not be possi-ble, “each of the three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by this present Treaty.”
The Treaty of Alliance, which was between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, thus not including Britain, was intended to reinforce the ra-tionale of the whole series of arrangements: that Greco-Turkish friend-ship was in the last resort worth more than the strict arithmetic and practical convenience of Cypriot politics. A committee of the three for-eign ministers was “the supreme political body” of the alliance. Under its authority there should be a tripartite headquarters established on the island, with military contingents of 950 Greeks and 650 Turks to provide for the defense of the new republic and to train the new Cypriot army
The extent to which this complex of arrangements, redolent of old-fashioned diplomacy, was legally valid in the light of the United Nations Charter has been the subject of much debate among international lawyers. The question was whether a constitution so rigid and unalterable was compatible with the equal sovereignty which was rec-ognized in the charter and whether its unchangeable nature could va-lidly be enforced under a treaty which permitted any one of the signa-tories individually to take action.
It is a complex argument which has not been resolved.
Certainly Professor Ernst Forsthoff, the German who was the first president of the Supreme Constitutional Court, was to say [in 1963]: “I consider it wrong to regard Cyprus under the present agreement and constitution as an independent state.” The guarantees, he added, “include also a right of actual intervention — there can be no guarantee without the right of intervention.” Clearly the signatories, it may be presumed, thought they were signing valid documents. Archbishop Makarios subsequently claimed that the settlement was imposed on him by force majeure and that he did not feel morally bound by it.
Archbishop Makarios was elected the first president of Cyprus by the Greek voters in December 1959 and Dr. Fazil Küçük the first vice president by the Turks. The archbishop had critics both on the right from supporters of Grivas — who left the island for a hero’s welcome in Athens and the rank of a retired general — and on the left because the settlement had been brought under the aegis of NATO. He moved swiftly to consolidate his position — by appointing EOKA people to key posi-tions, most notably Polycarpos Yorgadjis as minister of the interior, and by launching a vigorous foreign policy of friendship with the non-aligned powers which served to disarm the potential opposition of the communists in AKEL who were given five unopposed members in the first House. But the same process of satisfying the political needs of the Greek Cypriot community straightaway led to a series of conflicts with the Turks, in which the feelings of the two communities about the constitution were made plain.
The Greek Cypriots’ feeling was that the constitutional privileges accorded the Turkish community were preposterous; the Turkish Cy-priots’ that these were the bare minimum, to be exercised to the last ounce.
The disputes concerned:
(a) The 70:30 ratio in the public service: The Turkish Cypriots required that the proportion should be attained within five months of independence as had in fact been stipulated in a pre-independence agreement between the president-elect and the vice president-elect.
The Greek Cypriots in the Public Service Commission argued that they could not draw from 18 percent of the population which was poorly qualified suitable candidates to fill 30 percent of the jobs overnight. After three years the Greek Cypriots published figures to show that real progress had been made in all grades towards the objective. But the subject rankled and aroused resentment in both communities. At the end of 1963 there were 2,000 appeals outstanding in the Supreme Constitutional Court about public appointments.
Lizbon Antlaşmasının labirentlerine girmeden önce sevgili okurlarımın KURBAN BAYRAMI’nı kutlar, sağlık ve mutluluklar dolu nice bayramları görmelerini dilerim.
13 Aralık 2007 tarihinde AB Devlet ve Hükümet Başkanları Konseyi’nde imzalanan Lizbon Antlaşması’nın ve Nihai Senet’in resmi olmayan çevirisini edinmek isteyen okurlarım bana e-mail göndererek söz konusu çevirileri edinebilirler.
AB’nin temelini oluşturan topluluk antlaşmaları 1950’li yıllarda Avrupa’da ortaya çıkan ulus-devlet krizinin ve aşırı milliyetçiliğin ortaya çıkardığı güç mücadelelerinin sona erdirilmesini amaçlıyordu. Kömür Çelik ve diğer topluluk antlaşmaları ile Avrupa ülkeleri bu çabasında başarılı oldu. Avrupa, tarihindeki en uzun barış dönemini yaşıyor bu topluluklar sayesinde.
Ancak son yıllarda AB ülkelerinde yükselen aşırı milliyetçilik, ırkçılık, yabancı düşmanlığı, kendinden olmayanı ötekileştiren, zenginliğini paylaşmakta kıskanç davranan gruplaşmaların oluşmasına ve AB’nin karakteristik yapısını bozmaya başladı.
Avrupa Anayasası’nın 2005’te Fransa’da ve Hollanda’da referandumla reddedilmesi nedeniyle, tarihinin en önemli kimlik bunalımına giren Avrupa Birliği, bu sorunu Lizbon Antlaşması ile atlatmayı hedefliyor. Anlaşma, 27 ülkenin ulusal çıkarlarını “Avrupa Birliği ruhunun” önünde tutan, hassas dengeler üzerine kurulu ve teknik anlamda “kötünün iyisi” olarak adlandırılabilecek bir belge.
İçeriği, birkaç önemli değişiklik dışında, “Avrupa Anayasası”yla uyuşan Lizbon Antlaşması, her ülkeyi yüzde 100 memnun etmemekle birlikte, son genişleme dalgalarıyla üye sayısı 27’ye yükselen AB’ye daha dinamik bir işleyiş kazandırma amacı taşıyor.
Üye ülkeler arasında giderek artan karar alma zorluğunu belli oranda giderme hedefi de bulunan antlaşma, halen yürürlükte olan Nice Antlaşması’nın yerini alacak ve kurumsal işleyişin temel belgesi haline gelecek.
Lizbon Antlaşması’nın, yürürlüğe girebilmesi için tüm üyeler tarafından 1 Ocak 2009’a kadar onaylanmış olması gerekiyor.
Antlaşma ile getirilen önemli değişiklikler su şekilde özetlenebilir:
AB-Türkiye ilişkileri açısından Lizbon Antlaşmasının önemi, Avrupa Birliği’nin Türkiye’ye karsı net bir siyasi tavır belirlemesi için önce kendi içindeki sorunları çözmesini ön görmektedir.
Bu bağlamda Lizbon Antlaşması ile getirilen değişikliklerin kurumsal aksaklıkları ortadan kaldırması, Türkiye’nin daha az sorunlu bir Birliğe katılımını kolaylaştıracaktır. Ne var ki, Anlaşma’nın, gelecek genişlemeler için bir öngörüde bulunmaması olumsuz bir durumdur.
Akdeniz Birliği gibi önerileri daha sık gündeme getirebilecek güçlendirilmiş işbirliği ile birlikte değerlendirildiğinde, bu durum, Türkiye karşıtı bazı Üye Devletler tarafından kullanılabilir. Bu nedenle de “İmtiyazlı Ortaklık” gibi tam üyelik dışındaki öneriler daha fazla gündeme gelebilir.
Türkiye’nin 1 Ocak 2009’da başlayacak bu yeni süreç içinde akılcı, süratli, ısrarcı ve dikkatli bir strateji izlemesi gerekmektedir.
Rum gazetelerine ve Kıbrıs Rum Yönetimi başkanı Papadopulos’a göre BM Güvenlik Konseyinin 14 Aralık tarih ve 1789 sayılı kararı büyük bir zafer.
Gerçekten de bir zafer mi?
Biz her şeyi kaybettik de Rumlar Kıbrıs konusunda yeni kazanımlar mı elde etti?
Her şey bitti mi?
Bunu yanıtı, kısa ve öz olarak “Hiçte öyle değil”dir.
Bu olaya nereden, hangi açıdan ve neyi hedefleyerek baktığınıza bağlı.
BM Güvenlik Konseyinin son aldığı 14 Aralık 2007 tarih ve 1789 sayılı kararını, yıllar önce alınan ve izolasyonlara temel teşkil eden 18 Kasım 1983 tarihli 541 sayılı karar ve 11 Mayıs 1984 tarihli 550 sayılı kararla ve bunların üstüne inşa edilen tüm diğer kararlar ile kıyaslandığında, yaşanan gelişmelerin ve alınan bu son kararın çokta kötü olmadığı, tam tersine Rumlar için de bir yenilgi olduğu ortaya çıkmaktadır.
Zaten kararın içeriği ne olursa olsun, Papadopulos BM Güvenlik Konseyinin bu kararını bir zafer olarak nitelemek zorundadır. Dişli rakiplerle seçime gitmektedir ve en küçük bir başarısızlık veya yenilgi mesajı, cumhurbaşkanlığı seçimlerini kaybetmesine neden olacaktır. Bu nedenle de kararı bir zafer olarak nitelemesi çok doğaldır.
Ama gerçekte Papadopulos’un her zaman olduğu gibi yalana dayalı “Kıbrıs’lı Türklere uygulanan herhangi bir İzolasyon yoktur” propagandası, bu son yedi gündeki gelişmeler sonrasında açıkça iflas etmiştir. Kıbrıslı Türklere izolasyonların uygulandığı BM’nin 1.ci adamı tarafından dile getirilmiş ve kayıtlara geçmiştir. Üstelik Genel Sekreter Ban Ki Moon, “İzolasyonlar” konusunda bir genelleme yapmamış, üstü kapaklı konuşmamış, tam tersine tam bir vurgulama yapmış ve kaldırılması için çağrı yapmıştır.
Rusya Dış İşleri bakanı Sergey Lavrov adaya apar topar boşuna gelmedi. Raporun yayınlanmasından sonra Papadopulos sıkıntıya düşmesin diye Papadopulos’a destek vermek, Rusya hükümetinin Papadopulos’un arkasında olduğu imajını yaratmak ve raporu yumuşatacağına dair söz vermek için geldi. Nitekim sözünü tam olarak olamasa da tutabildi ve rapordaki “İzolasyonlar” kelimesinin çıkartılması ve yerine “ Son 6 aydaki gelişmeler” kelimelerinin konmasına ön ayak oldu.
BM Güvenlik Konseyi üyesi Rusya, Fransa ve Çin, kararın Kıbrıslı Rumların istekleri doğrultusunda çıkması için çabalamalarına karşın ABD ve İngiltere’nin karşı koymaları sonucunda ortak bir yol bulundu ve rapor yumuşatılarak karar şekline dönüştürüldü.
Ama BM Genel Sekreteri Ban Ki Moon’un 3 Aralık pazartesi günü yayınladığı Barış Gücü (UNFICYP)’in görev süresinin uzatılmasıyla ilgili ve içinde Kıbrıslı Türklere uygulanan İzolasyonların kaldırılmasına ilişkin önerilerin de yer aldığı rapor rafa kaldırılmış veya aniden yok olmuş değildir. Rapor oradadır ve artık arşiv kayıtlarında yerini almıştır.
BM Genel Sekreteri Ban Ki Moon, söz konusu UNFICYP raporunda Kıbrıslı Türklere uygulanan ambargoların kalkmasını ilk kez açıkça desteklediğini ortaya koymuş ve raporunda izolasyonların kalkmasının “tanınma teşkil etmeyeceğini” de vurgulamıştır.
Papadopulos’un “Kıbrıs’lı Türklere uygulanan herhangi bir İzolasyon yoktur” çırpınışlarına ve yalana dayalı politikasına bir son vermektedir bu rapor.
Üstelik Kıbrıslı Türklere uygulanan izolasyonlar konusu raporun “olaylar” kısmında değil “gözlemler” bölümünde yer almıştır.
BM Genel Sekreterinin gözlemi, “Kıbrıslı Türklere İzolasyonların uygulandığı ve kaldırılması gerektiği” şeklindedir.
Kıbrıs konusundaki gerçekler yavaş yavaş ortaya çıkmaya başlamıştır.
BM Güvenlik Konseyinin 14 Aralık tarih ve 1789 sayılı kararına bir başka açıdan bakıldığında da görülen ve hissedilen, geleneksel olarak hemen hemen her kararda yer alan Kıbrıs konusunda Türkiye aleyhtarı imaların ve üstü kapalı suçlamaların, istila ve işgal gibi lafların bu raporda artık yer almadığıdır.
Aslında BM Genel Sekreteri Ban Ki Moon’un söz konusu raporu, bir yerde yıllar önce alınan ve izolasyonlara temel teşkil eden 18 Kasım 1983 tarihli 541 sayılı karar ve 11 Mayıs 1984 tarihli 550 sayılı kararları iyice zayıflatmaktadır.
541 ve 550 sayılı kararı alan organın başındaki kişi, bunlar artık kaldırılsın demektedir.
Bundan sonra Türk soylu devletlerin ve İKÖ üyesi ülkelerin alacakları ortak kararlar ve izolasyonları kaldırma girişimleri, BM Genel Sekreteri Ban Ki Moon’un 3 Aralık Raporu doğrultusunda, her ne kadar bu rapor BM Genel Kurulu veya Güvenlik Konseyi kararı olmasa da, Birleşmiş Millerler kararlarına aykırı bir davranış olarak tanımlanamayacaktır.
KKTC hükümeti, özellikle Eğitim, Spor ve Kültür alanındaki ambargolarının kaldırılması için bu raporu gerektiği her yerde masaya koyabilir ve arkasına Ban Ki Moon’u alarak taleplerde bulunabilir.
Cyprus gained her sovereign independence by virtue of a consti-tution and three treaties — the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Al-liance and the Treaty of Establishment, all of which came into force on the same day — Aug. 16, 1960.
They were interrelated so that, for example, the 48 “basic articles” of the Constitution were incorporated into the Treaty of Guarantee while the two Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance were in turn men-tioned to “have constitutional force” in Article 181 of the constitution.
The third treaty, the Treaty of Establishment, makes it clear that the boundaries of the Republic of Cyprus do not coincide with those of the island, in that Britain retains absolute sovereignty over two en-claves, totaling 99 square miles which contain the military bases of Ağrotur (Akrotiri) and Dikelya (Dhekelia). Britain is also given certain military rights (such as exclusive control of the Nicosia airport in the event of an emergency) on the territory of the republic.
The constitution was drawn up explicitly in terms of the two people — and was referred to subsequently by the Turkish Cypriots as a functional federation, though that expression does not actually appear.
The official languages were Greek and Turkish. The Greek and Turkish flags could be flown without any restrictions, though there was also to be a national flag.
The Greek and Turkish national holidays were to be observed.
The country was defined as “an independent and sovereign re-public with a presidential regime, the president being Greek and the vice president being Turkish elected by the Greek and Turkish com-munities of Cyprus respectively.” There were 10 ministers, seven cho-sen by the president and three by the vice president (in practice a Tur-kish Cypriot was appointed to defense). Decisions in the Council of Ministers were to be taken by absolute majority, except that either the president or the vice president had an absolute veto over decisions relating to foreign affairs, defense or internal security and a delaying one on other matters.
The legislative system was unicameral. The House of Representa-tives had 50 members: 35 Greek and 15 Turkish. This ratio was unila-terally changed to 56 Greek and 24 Turkish by Greek Cypriots without the consent of Turkish Cypriots during the “Dark Era,” namely between the years 1963-1974.
According to Article 78(2), “any law imposing duties or taxes shall require a simple majority of the representatives elected by the Greek and Turkish communities respectively taking part in the vote.” This provision also applied to any change in the electoral law and the adop-tion of any law relating to the municipalities. This last question baffled the constitution makers. In five of the towns, separate Greek and Tur-kish municipalities had emerged as a consequence of the communal confrontations of 1958 and had been recognized by the British. They would now be officially established, thereby becoming the only organ of the constitution based on the idea of territorial separation, but for only four years during which the president and the vice president were supposed to decide between them whether they were to continue.
Legislation on other subjects was to take place by simple majority but again the president and the vice president had the same right of veto — absolute on foreign affairs, defense and internal security, delay-ing on other matters — as in the Council of Ministers. Outside the House of Representatives there were to be elected two communal chambers, one Greek, the other Turkish, which were given separate functions not entrusted to the House. These included education, reli-gious matters, personal status, sport, culture, producer and consumer cooperatives and credit establishments. For these purposes they were entitled to impose taxes, set up courts and conduct their own relations with the Greek and Turkish governments over help with funds or with personnel.
The judicial system was headed both by the Supreme Constitu-tional Court and by the High Court of Justice, each consisting of Greek and Turkish Cypriot judges, each with a neutral president (who should not be Cypriot, Greek, Turkish or British). The High Court had mainly appellate jurisdiction but could also deal with “offences against the constitution and the constitutional order.” The Supreme Constitutional Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the allocation of functions and powers between the various institutions. Either president or vice pres-ident might appeal to this court whenever he thought that a law in-cluding, specifically, the budget, would have the effect of discriminating against one of the communities. Moreover human rights were strongly protected.
A long series of guarantees against discrimination and in support of fundamental rights and liberties (Articles 6 to 35) were closely based on the appropriate European conventions. Finally, the constitution recognized the bi-communal nature of Cyprus in its arrangements for administration. The public service should approximate in all grades of its hierarchy to a 70:30 ratio. The Public Service Commission was to consist of 10 members, seven of them Greek, but a number of decisions were made dependent on the approval of at least two of the Turkish members.
There was to be a Cypriot army, 2,000 strong, of which 1,200 should be Greeks and 800 Turks, together with security forces, com-prising police and gendarmerie, also totaling 2,000, but this time with 1,400 Greeks to 600 Turks; forces stationed in parts of the republic inhabited almost totally by one community should have policemen drawn entirely from that community.
The island of Cyprus has been attempting to resolve its internal and external political associations for the past 52 years.
The roots of the Cyprus problem can be traced back to the 1950s, when Greek Cypriot and Greek aspirations to achieve enosis (the island’s union with Greece) took the form of a terrorist campaign against Turkish Cypriots as well as British colonial rule. Despite at-tempts by Greece to exploit the issue in the UN, the UN General As-sembly has not upheld Greek demands designed to achieve annexation under the guise of self-determination, but urged negotiations among the parties concerned. So when Britain gave Cyprus independence in 1960, a series of sui generis agreements had to be reached, designed to compromise the conflicting interests of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, as well as Greece and Turkey. *
The “state of affairs” created in Cyprus by the international trea-ties of 1960 was one of political and sovereign equality and the equal constituent status of the two peoples. By virtue of these international treaties, limited sovereignty had been transferred by the two peoples, conjointly and in partnership, in order to establish the 1960 bi-communal Republic of Cyprus. Under the 1960 Treaties of Guarantee and of Alliance, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Greece became gua-rantors of the new state of affairs which aimed at preventing either one of the two constituent peoples from imposing its political will over the other as well as establishing a fair balance between the two mother-lands, Turkey and Greece, vis-à-vis Cyprus.
The 1960 agreements that gave birth to the “Republic of Cyprus” were therefore firmly based on the equality of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the independence and sovereignty of the island. A bi-communal state mechanism was created with the effective participation of both sides in all organs of the joint state. Annexation and partition were expressly proscribed. The Greek Cypriots and Greece, however, regarded the establishment of a republic based on partnership as a temporary setback in their ultimate aim of uniting the island with Greece, i.e., enosis, and attempted to destroy both the internal and the external balances created by the 1960 state of affairs from the very first day they were established. The Greek Cypriots resorted to violence in December 1963 and expelled their Turkish Cypriot partners from all the government organs by force of arms, usurping the state machinery. The Turkish Cypriot people refused to bow to this illegality. Thus, years of unprecedented cruelty, bloodshed and suffering started for the Turkish Cypriot people.
During the 1963-1974 period, hundreds of Turkish Cypriots were murdered by armed Greek Cypriot paramilitaries, and a quarter of the Turkish Cypriot population (some 30,000 people) were rendered home-less. Hundreds more were abducted or subjected to enforced disap-pearance, never to be seen or heard from again. Those lucky enough to survive Greek Cypriot atrocities withdrew into small enclaves, the total area of which corresponded to a mere 3 percent of the territory of Cy-prus, and led the life of a refugee, surviving only thanks to Turkish Red Crescent aid. The entire world merely watched all this as a passive spectator for a decade. The UN peacekeeping force sent to the island in 1964 was ineffective and helpless. Greece acted in violation of its treaty obligations as a guarantor power. Britain also remained indifferent to its obligations under the same status. Turkish Cypriots were relieved from this ordeal and saved from total extermination by the legitimate and timely intervention of Turkey undertaken in accordance with its treaty rights and obligations in 1974, after the Greeks had made a bloody attempt at the final takeover of Cyprus by Greece through a coup d’état organized by the junta in Athens and its collaborators in Cyprus. *
Divided by a bitter history of communal violence and reliant upon the support of Turkey and Greece for protection against one another, the two Cypriot peoples have coexisted uneasily in this fashion on the same island for nearly four-and-a-half decades.
It was only after the Turkish intervention that, for the first time after 1963, Greek Cypriot violence could be brought to an end and a serious search undertaken for a negotiated settlement. Armed UN troops guard the so-called Green Line between them. Despite decades of talks aimed at reaching a settlement for some kind of federal Cyprus and normalization of relations, internal arrangements remain unfi-nished business.
Internally, the island remains divided into two de facto states, one Turkish Cypriot (KKTC) and one Greek Cypriot (ROC), neither of which recognizes the legitimacy of the other.
With its unilateral and unlawful application for EU membership in 1990, the Greek Cypriot side added a new and crucial dimension to its efforts to frustrate negotiations and do away with parameters which had been developed through hard work over the years. The Greek Cy-priot side never concealed that it was using EU membership as a ploy for doing away with the vested rights of the Turkish Cypriot people and for destroying the balance between Turkey and Greece over Cyprus in favor of Greece. The unilateral and unlawful application of the Greek Cypriot regime for EU membership was void from the beginning and cannot be binding on the Turkish Cypriots or on Cyprus as a whole. The Greek Cypriot administration has no lawful authority or right un-der the 1960 treaties to make such an application on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots or the whole of Cyprus. Consequently, the EU should not have processed it as if it were a valid application.
The two sides on the island have had no institutional links since 1963. They are living under their own respective states and governing themselves separately. These two states should be able to resolve their differences through their own free will. They should arrive at an agreement over core issues such as property, territory and security. They themselves should decide how they wish to live in the future. Attempts to impose settlement models from outside would only bring grave risks. Enforced cohabitation of the two peoples by way of formulas that do not respond to the realities of the island and thereby risk the re-emergence of ethnic strife and violence cannot be labeled as a good solution. The tragedies in the Balkans should have thought the EU and the UN to be absolutely cautious in addressing ethnic conflicts. A confederation within the European Union should now be strongly considered for a long-lasting and sustainable solution on the island.
