Turkey’s July 20, 1974 intervention on Cyprus was legal, say the Athens Court of Appeals and the Council of Europe.
The Council of Europe adopted Resolution 573 on July 29, 1974 on this particular case, stating that Turkey’s intervention on Cyprus was a legitimate act emanating from the Treaty of Guarantee, Part IV.
The historical decision of the Athens Court of Appeals, No. 2658/79, dates back to March 21, 1979.
On July 15, 1974, the junta ruling Greece implemented a coup d’etat on Cyprus, overthrowing the elected government of President Makarios, which had been in control since the independence of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960. On July 20 of the same year Turkey staged a military intervention to reverse the coup.
Turkey’s action was perfectly legitimate and understandable. It was in fact a duty, stationed by the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus; in Part IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, which forms part of the constitution. Cyprus was saved from being annexed by Greece and the Turkish Cypriots freed from Greek oppression.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the Western world only watched as the Turkish Cypriots were being massacred by their Greek Cypriot neighbors, with the aid of Greece, in a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing, and did nothing.
The splitting of Cyprus into two ethnically homogeneous, self-governing states was not achieved by the Turkish military intervention in 1974, as is commonly believed, but by Makarios and Georgios Grivas a decade earlier in 1963. All that the Turkish intervention of 1974 accomplished was to consolidate Turkish Cypriot enclaves into a uni-fied Turkish Cypriot zone in Northern Cyprus and to save their lives.
Of all the nations in the world only Turkey had the humanity to save what was left of the Turkish Cypriot population after years of eth-nic cleansing in 1974, and only Turkey now stands for justice in Cy-prus.
Under the provisions of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee which pro-vided that the Hellenic Republic, Turkey and United Kingdom would ensure the independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, it was Turkey’s legal duty to take unilateral military action purportedly to restore constitutional order.
The Turkish intervention was perfectly legal according to the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960. Its legality has even been acknowledged by the Standing Committee of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in a resolution dated July 29, 1979, and by the Athens Court of Appeals in a decision dated March 21, 1979. Sampson admitted that he was just about to proclaim enosis (union of Cyprus with Greece) when the Turkish intervention occurred (Cyprus Mail, July 17, 1975).
A father of one of the Greek commandos sent to Cyprus by the Greek junta in July 1974 to fight against Turkish Cypriots and Turkish troops who was shot down by Greek Cypriot National Guard members, filed a case against the Greek government for compensation in December 1976.
The Court of Athens ruled in favor of the father and ordered rea-sonable compensation to be paid by the Department of the Treasury of the Greek Ministry of Finance.
The Ministry of Finance objected to the decision of the Court of Athens and appealed to the Athens Court of Appeals for a cancellation of this order.
But unexpectedly the Supreme Court decided in favor of the fa-ther again and confirmed the decision of the Court of Athens.
The first paragraphs of the justification of the Athens Court of Appeals explains in detail the 1960 Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, Part IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, the rights of Turkey, the coup d’etat organized by the Greek junta against Makarios and the improper behavior of Gen. Phaedon Gizikis, the head of Greece’s junta government in 1974.
The very last paragraph clearly highlights the legitimacy of the Turkish intervention on Cyprus.
The preposterous assertions by the Greek and Greek Cypriot gov-ernments that the Turkish Cypriots are nothing but a rebellious mi-nority and that the Turkish peace operation of 1974 was an unprovoked act of aggression are in fact aimed to misinform the world.
Unfortunately many European and American politicians sub-scribe to this spurious version of events, not knowing that by promoting the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus without adequate guarantees for the protection of the Turkish Cypriot people they are, in fact, promoting the creation of new problems on the island which will turn out like Iraq if Turkish troops withdraw.
The Greek Cypriot administration has clearly defined its unwil-lingness for a new start to negotiations based on the Annan plan.
Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s 2006 request for the Greek side to make a written submission of their proposals on alterations to the plan has still not been met.
In addition, Greek Cypriot leader Tassos Papadopoulos declared his unwillingness to negotiate at the start of the talks, referring to “un-reasonable” time restrictions and the submission of a plan that had not previously been agreed upon. It is apparent that before the presidential elections, which will take place in February 2008, real progress toward a resolution should not be expected from the Greek Cypriot side.
This doesn’t necessarily mean that Mr. Papadopoulos’ policy will be abandoned if he is not re-elected or his presidential term reaches an end. The Greek Cypriot administration will carry on with general policy on the Cyprus issue, as has been unanimously agreed in the Greek National Council, consisting of all Greek political parties.
Greeks hold the advantage when one takes into consideration Turkey’s difficult negotiations with the EU. Submission of unacceptable proposals to the Turkish side by the Greek Cypriots has become common practice. It is probable that the Greek Cypriots will simply end the negotiations, claiming irreconcilability with the Turkish side. The other possibility is that they will exert international pressure on Turkey by starting negotiations only with the intent to prolong them indefinitely to cause further obstacles in Turkey’s EU accession process.
Calling Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat for talks on Sept. 5 is merely a show to influence Greek Cypriot voters in the coming presidential elections. Unless the international community takes measures to ease the embargos on Turkish Cypriots and calls for equal political treatment for them, there will be no reason for the Greek Cy-priot administration to continue seeking a solution.
One factor that will affect the progress of the Cyprus problem will be the actions of Greece. With a change in the cabinet of the New De-mocracy Party (NDK) government in February 2006, Greece became observably more active on the Cyprus problem, appointing Dora Ba-koyannis as foreign minister. In fact Bakoyannis stated immediately after her appointment that the Cyprus problem would be given priority among foreign affairs issues. Her comments during her visits to Greek Cyprus pointed out what line Greek Cyprus and Greece will take on the Cyprus issue and in Turkey’s EU accession talks as well. Bakoyannis’ first statement addressed the Annan plan; she asserted that it became null and void with the “no” vote of the Greeks and cannot be placed on the table again.
The views of the Turkish, Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot people, and their support or opposition to their administration’s policy, will be instrumental in shaping future progress on the Cyprus problem. Concerning the morale of Turkish Cypriots, the hope and enthusiasm ignited by the opening of the borders on April 23, 2003, were extinguished by the disappointment of the referendum of April 24, 2004.
Lack of fulfillment of the promises to lift the embargos has created distrust of the EU by the Turkish Cypriots. While their economic conditions are improving, they are still faced with the looming uncer-tainty of their future, still hanging in political limbo, exacerbated by their misgivings regarding the EU. In the meantime Greek Cypriots are quickly moving away from the idea of living together with Turkish Cyp-riots, as was recently revealed in polls held in Greek Cyprus.
